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INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1950’s, Professor Henry M. Hart Jr. and Professor Albert M. 
Sacks put forth the legal process theory and the principle of institutional 
settlement.1 The principle of institutional settlement, proposes that when 
decisions are made by an institution that has been granted competence to 
make relevant decisions (such as a trial court or clemency board), and those 
decisions are “arrived at [as a] result of duly established procedures . . . .”2 
they “ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and 
until they [the procedures] are [duly] changed.”3 The principle theorizes in-
stitutional decisions are legitimized by procedural consistency in the deci-
sion-making processes of that institution, rather than whether the institu-
tion’s decisions are substantively accurate. 
The American Innocence Movement, propelled by the discovery of DNA 
technology in the 1980s, however, has proven that “duly established proce-
dures” utilized across the criminal justice system can (and do) generate sub-
stantively erroneous results.4 DNA technology has “shattered [a] perception 
of virtual infallibility”5 and exposed the reality that factual error in the 
criminal justice system is, as Findley puts it, “systemic, not just freakishly 
rare or merely episodic.”6  Although, as of March 2016, 337 people in 
America have been exonerated through DNA testing7 and other evidence 
has provided relief to over 1200 individuals,8 the criminal justice system 
continues to take a conservative approach towards providing relief. This 
cautious approach is particularly apparent when concerns about the substan-
tive accuracy of forensic science evidence used against a petitioner is ques-
tioned post-conviction. This is demonstrable upon examining the judicial 
interpretation of legal claims based on arguments that forensic science iden-
																																																													
1 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
2031, 2031 (1994). 
2 Id. at 2045. 
3 See id. 
4 DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.innocenceproject 
.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide. 
5 Keith A. Findley, Innocence Found: Thee New Revolution in American Criminal Justice, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 4 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014). 
6 Id. 
7 See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.innocence 
project.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide. 
8 Univ. of Mich. Law School, The First 1,600 Exonerations, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/1600_Exonerations.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2016). 
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tification evidence used against a petitioner is unreliable and/or access to 
DNA testing should be allowed.9 
Petitioners pursue such claims through a variety of post-conviction relief 
mechanisms. These mechanisms include (1) appellate frameworks allowing 
challenges to the admissibility of allegedly unreliable forensic science iden-
tification evidence admitted at trial;10 (2) newly discovered evidence 
frameworks that provide relief in the event that “new” and diligently dis-
covered evidence of “shifting scientific opinion” has “verdict changing ca-
pacity”;11 and (3) appellate frameworks that facilitate claims for access to 
DNA testing in order to, inter alia, support a petition for clemency.12 An 
examination of relevant case law, however, reveals that such claims are 
rarely successful.13 
The courts’ conservative approach to these sorts of claims reveals a judi-
cial fidelity to the legal process vision. In particular, the courts show a gen-
eral willingness to (A) defer to the principle of institutional settlement i.e., 
preserve trial court decisions concerning forensic science evidence, jury 
verdicts about guilt and the applications of state post-conviction procedures; 
(B) protect ‘finality’ interests in order to foreclose claims for relief; (C) ac-
cept outcomes generated by rational procedures (despite such procedures 
arguably being ill-suited for making accurate assessments about scientific 
uncertainty); and (D) exalt form over substance when faced with scientific 
uncertainty.14 Collectively these themes can sideline notions of substantive 
accuracy. 
This article confirms the existence of these legal process-centric themes 
and considers some potential implications of these approaches. Part I briefly 
sets out key tenets of the legal process vision and provides some back-
ground to the American Innocence Movement. Using examples from rele-
vant case law, Part II examines the courts’ approaches thematically, demon-
																																																													
9 See generally, Myrna S. Raeder, Post Convictions Claims of Innocence, 24 CRIM. JUST. (2009). 
10 See Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses to Develop-
ments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234 (2013); see also Unreliable or Improper Forensic Sci-
ence, INNOCENCE PROJECT http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science 
.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).  
11 See Sarah Lucy Cooper, Judicial Responses to Shifting Scientific Opinion in Forensic Identification 
Evidence and Newly Discovered Evidence Claims in the United States: The Influence of Finality and 
Legal Process Theory, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 649 (2015); see also Daniel G. Orenstein, Shaken to 
the Core: Emerging Scientific Opinion and Post-Conviction Relief in Cases of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1305 (2010-11).  
12 See Sarah Lucy Cooper, Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing and Clemency as a “Fail-Safe”: The 
Implications of Judicial Fidelity to the Legal Process Vision, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (2016). 
13 See generally notes 10 –12.   
14 See generally Raeder, supra note 9.  
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strating how the courts exhibit loyalty to the legal process vision. It also 
considers the implications of this loyalty, including that it can result in both 
the extraction of science from its social context and an awkward approach 
towards discerning between credible and incredible forensic science evi-
dence of individualization, as well as represent a failure, by the courts, to 
acknowledge the corrective justice function afforded to clemency by the 
common law. Part III concludes that these approaches to judicial decision-
making ultimately fail to accept the way in which new and credible evi-
dence – particularly forensic science evidence – can cast legitimate doubt 
on the verdict of a trial or, indeed, impact the proceedings of a clemency 
board, “quite apart from any procedural defect.”15 In light of the American 
Innocence Movement, the courts’ largely unreserved fidelity to the legal 
process vision, in the context explored, is troublesome, and warrants new 
approaches that are more sensitive to substantive accuracy. 
I. KEY TENETS OF THE LEGAL PROCESS VISION AND THE RISE 
OF THE AMERICAN INNOCENCE MOVEMENT 
Legal Process Theory was conceived by Professor Henry M. Hart Jr. and 
Professor Albert M. Sacks in the 1960s.16 At the center of that vision is the 
principle of institutional settlement, which theorizes that it is procedural 
regularity in the decision-making process of a competent institution that le-
gitimizes the institution’s decisions.17 The theory is primarily concerned 
with appropriate institutions being granted competence to make relevant 
decisions, and such institutions yielding their decisions via rational proce-
dures.18 Procedure is considered to be “critically important”19 because, inter 
alia, it provides an effective way of obtaining “good” decisions, facilitates 
the collaboration of institutions in an interconnected institutional system 
(like the criminal justice system), and enhances the legitimacy of the law by 
generating such qualities as consistency, stability and rationality.20 Ulti-
mately, legal process theory thinking aims to preserve a competent institu-
																																																													
15 David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1027, 1060 (2010). 
16 See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1.   
17 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmod-
ern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 722 (1991). 
18 Id. at 770.  
19 Id. at 721. 
20 Id. at 721–22. 
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tion’s decisions that have been made through the application of rational 
procedures.21 
The legal process vision is closely linked to the concept of finality. The 
doctrine of finality developed out of a taxonomy detailed by Professor Paul 
M. Bator in 1963.22 Bator argued that the finality of criminal judgments 
serves important interests that are harmed by expansions of post-conviction 
rights,23 and proposed that because we can never be 100 percent certain that 
no error of law or fact was made during legal proceedings, “we must im-
pose an end to litigation at some point or else the case could conceivably go 
on ad infinitum.”24 As Popko summarizes, 
Essentially, Bator argues we must acknowledge that human systems, because 
fallible humans design them, are themselves inherently fallible. Thus, we must 
“come to terms with the possibility of error inherent in any [human] process.” 
The best way to deal with this probability of human error, he continues, is to 
design our systems of justice with sufficient procedures and arrangements such 
that there exists an “acceptable probability that justice will be done, that the 
facts found will be ‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct.’25 
Bator answered the question of why the criminal justice system needs fi-
nality by considering a series of “very real” consequences of endless litiga-
tion.26 Decades later, the criminal justice system is familiar with the notion 
that finality is not a singular “consequence” but rather shorthand for a col-
lection of interests assumed to be furthered by any restrictions on post-
conviction review.27 These interests include ensuring respect for criminal 
judgments, conserving state resources, furthering the efficiency and deter-
rent and educational functions of the criminal law, satisfying the human 
need for closure, incentivizing defense counsel to “get it right first time,” 
and preventing a flood of non-controversial claims from masking the fewer, 
credible ones.28 Finality assumes that providing defendants broader post-
																																																													
21 Id. at 722.  
22 See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). 
23 Id. at 446–47. 
24 Sigmund G. Popko, Putting Finality in Perspective: Collateral Review of Criminal Judgments in the 
DNA Era, 1 L. J. SOC. JUST. 75, 76 (2011). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 77. 
27 Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further 
the “Interests of Finality”, UTAH L. REV. 561, 568 (2013). 
28 See Carrie Sperling, When Finality and Innocence Collide, in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES 
IN AMERICA 139 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014); Bator, supra note 22, at 451–53; Henry J. Friendly, Is 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 146–49 
(1970); Kim, supra note 27. 
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conviction rights harms these interests.29 Consequently, when considering 
appeals, judges must balance society’s interests in finality against the rights 
of defendants.30 Of course, finality does serve the interests of defendants 
too, including their interests not to be subject to repetitive trials, to be able 
to move on in their lives, and not to be ‘caught’ by repetitive state attempts 
at trying a case (and its luck) that wear down the resources and stamina of 
the defendant.31 
Legal process is the focal point of Bator’s taxonomy.32 According to Ba-
tor, the efficacy of outcomes produced by the criminal justice system (such 
as jury verdicts, trial court decisions and clemency recommendations) re-
quire the application of a procedural model that provides “a reasoned and 
acceptable probability that justice will be done.”33 When faced with post-
conviction challenges, therefore, process thinkers ask such questions as: did 
the processes of the trial court give the petitioner a full and fair opportunity 
to confront the case against him and present his own case?  And, did the so-
cial actors within that process act in accordance with those procedures? If 
so, legal process dictates the outcome is legitimate (whether it is substan-
tively accurate or not).34 Legal process thinkers look for rational decision-
making and procedural regularity.35 Consequently, the process model si-
multaneously protects finality interests by restricting the means available to 
usurp a rationally processed conviction. This approach underpins post-
conviction frameworks across America,36 and courts “have fully embraced 
the concept of finality.”37 
However, the efficacy of these process-centric approaches (as blanket 
approaches, that is) in the Era of Innocence is questionable. The discovery 
of DNA technology in the 1980s and the subsequent understanding that this 
forensic science discipline could, with unrivalled levels of scientific cer-
																																																													
29 Kim, supra note 27, at 572–73.  
30 Kim, supra note 27, at 612–13.  
31 Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction Discovery, Investiga-
tion, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545, 552–53 (2014). 
32 See Gabriel A. Carrera, Section 1983 & The Age of Innocence: The Supreme Court Carves a Proce-
dural Loophole for Post-Conviction DNA Testing in Skinner v. Switzer, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 431, 440 
(2011) (noting that Bator’s taxonomy has been referred to as “Bator’s Process View”). 
33 Bator, supra note 22, at 448. 
34 Carrera, supra note 32. 
35 See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 17, at 709–10, 738. 
36 Sperling, supra note 28. 
37 Popko, supra note 24, at 77. 
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tainty and consistency, prove both innocence and guilt, kick-started signifi-
cant changes in the American criminal justice system.38 
In 1992, Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld formed The Innocence 
Project “to assist prisoners who could be proven innocent through DNA 
testing.”39  By the end of 1993, 135 people had been exonerated, including 
14 whose innocence had been conclusively proven by post-conviction DNA 
evidence.40 Over the last two decades, the number of DNA exonerations has 
continued to grow, along with an increased understanding of the propensity 
of the criminal justice system to generate factual errors.41  The concept of 
“innocence” is now a burgeoning feature of legal, social and political dis-
course,42 with the Innocence Movement being described as “the most dra-
matic development in the criminal justice world since the Warren Court’s 
Due Process Revolution of the 1960s.”43 
As of March 2016, post-conviction DNA testing in America had exoner-
ated 337 people, and the capacity of DNA technology to identify specific 
sources consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, has been rigor-
ously tested. 44 DNA evidence has become a gold-standard, raising the bar 
for what is scientifically acceptable for engaging in “individualization” i.e., 
identifying a source to the exclusion of all others.45 In particular, DNA 
technology has exposed the fallibility of numerous so-called ‘soft’ science 
forensic disciplines46 – such as tool-mark, bite-mark and microscopic hair 
																																																													
38 THE COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE 
FORENSIC SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 40 (2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT], 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf. 
39 Our Work, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent (last visited Apr. 5, 
2016).  
40 See Univ. of Mich. Law School, supra note 8. 
41 Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from Social Science, 7 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 9, 13 (2009).  
42 See Improve the Law: Policy, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/ 
improve-the-law/legislative-reform (last visited Apr. 5, 2016); see also Keith A. Findley, Defining Inno-
cence, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 1157, 1157–1158 (2011); see also CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN 
AMERICA (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014). 
43 Findley, supra note 5, at 1. 
44 INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 7; NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 7. 
45 Cooper, supra note 10, at 235-236; NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 7. 
46 It is worth noting that the labeling of these disciplines   as ‘soft’ sciences is not an official label, al-
though I use the label in this article to reflect the approach of many courts to name them as such. Tradi-
tional soft sciences include disciplines such as psychology and anthropology, and traditional hard sci-
ences include disciplines such as chemistry and physics. The disciplines given as examples at this 
footnote do not fall neatly into either category. DNA analysis, of course, would be a ‘hard science’, 
however. See Sarah Lucy Cooper, Forensic Identification Evidence: Tensions Between Law and Sci-
ence, J. PHIL. SCI. & L. 1 (2016) available at http://jpsl.org/files/7814/6014/5245/ForensicScience 
Identification.pdf (“Alongside the application of traditional hard and soft science disciplines to aid the 
solving of crime are a vast array of forensic science identification techniques . . . These disciplines do 
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analysis – with forty-seven percent of the wrongful convictions that led to 
the known 337 DNA exonerations being attributed, in some way, to unreli-
able and/or improper forensic evidence.47 
This revelation, in particular, has presented the criminal justice system 
with a complex challenge due to the long established role of forensic sci-
ence identification evidence in the criminal justice process. Throughout the 
20th and 21st centuries, American courts have embraced the notion that a 
plethora of ‘soft’ forensic science disciplines can engage in individualiza-
tion.48 For instance, courts have routinely accepted that fingerprints can 
uniquely identify the perpetrator of a crime, suspect notes can be “matched” 
to a suspect’s handwriting, bite-marks on a victim can be “matched” to a 
suspect’s teeth, ammunition from a suspect’s gun can be “matched” to sus-
pect ammunition, and a suspect’s vehicle tires, shoes and hairs can be 
“matched” to prints and hairs left at a crime scene respectively.49 In short, 
the hard science of DNA analysis has undermined the ‘soft’ science staples 
of the criminal justice system – calling into question decades of convictions 
in its wake. 
This observation was formally recognized in 2009 when the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) produced a landmark report—Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009 NRC Re-
port).50  This report acknowledged how the forensic science identification 
methods routinely serviced the criminal justice process in terms of crime-
solving,51 but also how they may be responsible for some known wrongful 
convictions.52 Most significantly, the report made the unprecedented con-
clusion that “with the exception of DNA analysis . . . no forensic method 
has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a 
																																																																																																																																													
not fall neatly into either category.” Id. at 2. 
47 The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-
wrongful-conviction (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).  
48 See Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and 
Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES J. 16, 29 (2005) (considering the role of judges in admitting forensic 
evidence).  
49 See generally Cooper, supra note 10 (considering how American courts have responded to develop-
ments in forensic science by focusing on fingerprint identification, firearms identification, bite mark 
identification, and arson investigations).  
50 Simon A. Cole & Gary Edmond, Science Without Precedent: The Impact of the National Research 
Council Report on the Admissibility and use of Forensic Science Evidence in the United States, 4 BRIT. 
J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (2015). “Strengthening changed the nature of the controversy because it 
could reasonably be represented as a quasi-official utterance of the American scientific establishment in 
a way that complemented, or perhaps eclipsed, the conclusions of both individual scientists and self-
organized collectives who had been raising their own concerns.” Id. at 588.  
51 NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 86. 
52 NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 4. 
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high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a 
specific individual or source.”53 This conclusion casts all the aforemen-
tioned ‘soft’ forensic science “matches” in a sharp, critical light, and soon 
after the report was published, the United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that many forensic sciences are subject to “serious deficiencies.”54 
An increased awareness of the fallibilities of many  ‘soft’ forensic sci-
ence disciplines has led petitioners, convicted in whole or part by such evi-
dence, to pursue post-conviction challenges to the relevant evidence used 
against them.55 Petitioners have done this through various appellate mecha-
nisms. These mechanisms include procedures that allow (1) challenges to 
the admissibility of such evidence; (2) claims that the indeterminacy sur-
rounding these disciplines qualifies as newly discovered evidence; and (3) 
claims for access to DNA testing on evidence existing in their case that 
might, inter alia, assist a petition for clemency.56 
An examination of relevant case law, however, reveals that such chal-
lenges are rarely successful.57 It also presents a generally robust judicial fi-
delity to the legal process vision. Part II examines the influence of legal 
process theory in this context, extracting general themes from the judici-
ary’s decision-making and highlighting possible implications of this legal 
process-centric rationale. 
II. THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL PROCESS THEORY: GENERAL 
THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS 
The courts’ approaches to the aforementioned post-conviction challenges 
related to soft science identification evidence and access to DNA testing, 
demonstrate four general themes in judicial decision-making. These themes 
showcase an allegiance, by the courts, to the legal process vision. These 
themes are: (A) a deference to the principle of institutional settlement (B) 
the protection of ‘finality’ interests; (C) an acceptance of outcomes gener-
ated by rational procedures (despite such procedures being ill-suited for 
making accurate assessments about scientific uncertainty); and (D) an exal-
tation of form over substance when faced with indeterminacy. Using exam-
																																																													
53 NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 7. 
54 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009). 
55 See Cole & Edmond, supra note 50, at 592. 
56 See generally notes 10–12.  
57 See generally notes 10–12; see also Jules Epstein, Preferring the “Wise Man” to Science: The Failure 
of Courts and Non-Litigation Mechanisms to Demand Validity in Forensic Matching Testimony, 20 
WIDENER L. REV. 81, 101 (2014). 
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ples from relevant case law, Part II explores these themes and highlights 
relevant implications. 
A. DEFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF INSTITUTIONAL 
SETTLEMENT 
The principle of institutional settlement theorizes that procedural regular-
ity in the decision-making processes of a competent institution legitimizes 
the institution’s decisions,58 and thereby ultimately aims to preserve a com-
petent institution’s rational decisions as generated by rational procedures. 
Fidelity to this principle is evident in cases where courts have rejected 
claims for access to DNA testing that could support, inter alia, a petition for 
clemency. This approach has gained momentum by way of the seminal case 
in this domain: District Attorney's Office of the Third Judicial District v. 
Osborne.59 In Osborne, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to 
“constitutionalize the issue [of access to DNA testing].”60 The majority 
found there was no freestanding due process right to DNA testing; and in-
stead found, “a qualified, derivative”61 procedural due process right to 
DNA testing based on “a liberty interest in demonstrating…innocence with 
new evidence under state law.”62 The Court bluntly rejected the argument 
that Osborne had a due process right to DNA testing derived from the lib-
erty interest he had in the context of clemency, 63 and applied precedent 
from a previous decision stating that, “noncapital defendants do not have a 
liberty interest in traditional state executive clemency, to which no particu-
lar claimant is entitled as a matter of state law.”64 Under the Court’s deci-
sion, Osborne was precluded from challenging the constitutionality of any 
procedures available to vindicate an interest in state clemency.65 
The principle of institutional settlement drove the majority decision. This 
is shown in a number of ways. First, the fact that Alaska provided an ade-
quate statute for obtaining post-conviction access to DNA evidence, which 
Osborne had neglected to utilize, meant he could not challenge the process 
as applied to him.66 This feature of the decision is indicative of the majority 
																																																													
58 See HENRY M HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (1994). 
59 Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009). 
60 Id. at 56. 
61 Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2921 (2010). 
62 Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68. 
63 Id. at 67.   
64 Id. at 67–68 (applying Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)). 
65 Id. at 68. 
66 Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 70–71 (2009). 
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analyzing Osborne’s claim as an issue of institutional settlement.  As one 
scholar explains: 
The existence of Alaska procedures to obtain post conviction DNA testing 
formed the opinion's “starting point in analyzing Osborne's constitutional 
claims.” After finding “nothing inadequate” about Alaska's procedures, the 
Court deliberately echoed Wilkinson in declining to “short-circuit” state legis-
lative activity. In the end, the majority did not find DNA's accuracy relevant to 
a debate it sees as fundamentally about the morality of federal courts overriding 
state processes.67 
Second, the Osborne majority believed there was a “dilemma [about] 
how to harness DNA's power to prove innocence without unnecessarily 
overthrowing the established system of criminal justice,”68 which was un-
derpinned by “traditional notions of finality.”69 Concerns about undermin-
ing the principle of institutional settlement are reflected in the Court's desire 
to maintain the trial as the “main event in which the issue of guilt or inno-
cence can be fairly resolved.”70 By couching the issue in these terms “the 
Court implied that DNA's truth-telling power must somehow be constrained 
to fit into our existing system as opposed to allowing the system to change 
in response to the unique power of DNA evidence.”71 In other words, a 
constitutional right to DNA testing does not fit the legal process vision be-
cause it undermines the efficacy of the criminal justice system, despite the 
application of its thousands of procedures and measures. 
Third, the Supreme Court observed the institutional competence of the 
political branches of state governments to determine how the law should 
address new technological developments: “[t]he elected governments of the 
States are actively confronting the challenges DNA technology poses to our 
criminal justice systems and our traditional notions of finality, as well as the 
opportunities it affords.”72  The Court worried that to constitutionalize this 
area suddenly would short-circuit “a prompt and considered legislative re-
sponse” 73 i.e., shirk the principle of institutional settlement. 
																																																													
67 Colin Starger, The DNA of an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 NW. J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1099-1100 (2009) (citations omitted). 
68 Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62.  
69 Id. at 72. 
70 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 506 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotation  
marks omitted). 
71 Jason Kreag, Letting Innocence Suffer: The Need for Defense Access to the Law Enforcement DNA 
Database, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 805, 846 (2015). 
72 Osborne, 557 U.S. at 72–73. 
73 Id. at 71. 
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Osborne’s legal process-centric precedent has led to the systemic rejec-
tion of similar challenges by the lower courts,74 with numerous courts ac-
tively applying the principle of institutional settlement to rationalize their 
decisions. For example, in Vaughn v. Office of the Judge for the Third Cir-
cuit Court, the petitioner made a variety of due process claims, including 
that that he had been prevented from proving his actual innocence and fur-
thering a clemency application by being denied access to DNA evidence. 75 
The U.S. District Court determined, however, that his clemency claim was 
barred.76 All that remained for Vaughn was the possibility of an attack on 
the fairness and/or application of the state’s DNA testing statute, which he 
had failed to make.77 The court found “that pleading failure cannot be cured 
because the Michigan statute reasonably balances the competing interests of 
the convicted person's right to pursue DNA evidence and testing with the 
state's right to maintain an orderly criminal justice system.”78 In other 
words, even without close examination, the state regime preserved the tradi-
tional notions of justice at the center of the majority’s concern in Osborne. 
Similarly, in Gary v. Humphrey, Gary motioned for DNA testing after 
being denied clemency by the state parole board.79 The motion was granted 
for certain evidence (with the court concluding that such testing may be 
relevant to a state clemency application), and compensation for Gary’s 
counsel and for a DNA expert was approved.80 Based upon the DNA test 
results, Gary pursued a second state clemency hearing simultaneously with 
an extraordinary motion for new trial in state court.81 Gary’s counsel sub-
mitted vouchers for services related to the second clemency proceeding and 
new trial motion.82 The court approved compensation for services con-
nected with the clemency proceeding, but denied compensation for services 
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75 Vaughn v. Office of the Judge for the Third Circuit Court, No. 14-CV-10458, 2015 WL 404254, at *1 
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related solely to the new trial. Gary appealed that decision to a U.S. District 
Court, which denied his appeal.83 
Although the District Court’s decision, by implication, agrees that a 
clemency hearing (particularly one including potential exculpatory DNA 
evidence) is sufficiently important to warrant state funded counsel, it also 
continues the cautious, process-sensitive trend demonstrated by the other 
courts. This is because the court made a point in its judgment to narrow the 
decision under a specially labeled “Future Guidance” section.84 In that sec-
tion, the court first stated it was not convinced that providing counsel to 
pursue DNA testing subsequent to the final dismissal of a federal habeas 
petition, even if it is to be used in support of clemency relief, was manda-
tory under federal law.85 Second, it underscored that its decision to fund 
counsel did “not include a legal right to DNA testing to be used to support a 
clemency petition.”86 In other words, it was not at odds with the Osborne 
decision. Third, the court was careful to acknowledge the principle of insti-
tutional settlement. It did so both by affirming that the right to DNA testing 
was a “limited right under Georgia law”87 and by underscoring that its deci-
sion did not undermine that regime, as, 
While the results [of the DNA testing] may also be used in a second clemency 
hearing, there is no statutory right to obtain those results for use in a clemency 
hearing, nor is there any statutory right to use them once they are obtained. The 
fact that they may be available for such future use in the clemency hearing is 
completely fortuitous.88  
The courts’ approach in this context has a number of implications. First, 
it undermines the corrective justice function of clemency. In Herrera v. 
Collins,89 the Court stated clemency is the “fail-safe”90 of the criminal jus-
tice system and the traditional remedy for miscarriages of justice.91 In Her-
rera, and in subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has placed great 
weight and faith in the clemency process”92 to remedy innocence claims,93 
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so much so that Professor Austin Sarat now considers gubernatorial clem-
ency to be “the court of last resort” for innocents.94 As a consequence, a 
right to a meaningful clemency process should be recognized, and part of 
this substance should be the opportunity to present exculpatory DNA evi-
dence, if it exists. As one scholar comments, 
In relying on the clemency process to fulfill an articulated and unique position 
in the criminal justice system, it is imperative that the Court uphold and main-
tain the integrity of the process. Therefore, the Court must ensure that prisoners 
have the tools necessary to present a meaningful petition to the clemency 
authority. Part of this meaningful ability to access the clemency process should 
be the ability to access state-held evidence for the purposes of modern DNA 
testing.95 
Moreover, such provision would encourage executives with decision-
making powers to be both more accurate and confident in making pro-
clemency decisions.  A shift towards tough-on-crime politics has effectively 
blinded the system to innocence claims, by fueling antipathetic executive 
attitudes towards clemency and encouraging narrow interpretations of what 
can be done using the clemency power.96  Thus, if a petitioner can access 
and test DNA evidence, and the results of such testing are exculpatory in 
some credible way, designing the constitutional framework to ensure that 
such evidence is presented to the executive is imperative. In other words, 
the constitutional framework should mandate state procedures that require, 
when available, that DNA evidence be presented in clemency proceedings. 
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Although this would naturally undermine prior juror verdicts and trial 
court decisions, it would be a regime that ultimately favored and delivered 
the closest approximation of substantive accuracy that science can currently 
offer.  It would also allow the executive to underpin his or her decision by 
way of this evidence, which is, at present, the most reliable individualiza-
tion evidence science can offer.97 A decision to grant clemency in such cir-
cumstances would not be ‘soft’ on crime, but simply a decision rooted in 
what is scientifically most accurate. As the dissent in Osborne pointed out, 
DNA is “uniquely precise”98 and unrivaled in its ability to ascertain the 
“truth.”99 Decisions underpinned by scientific evidence in this way would 
serve to strengthen the efficacy of the criminal justice system, not under-
mine it, as decisions that are likely more accurate are naturally more-
legitimate in the context of criminal process. Moreover, these decisions 
would be the product of a rationalized procedure designed at state level, 
thereby satisfying the principle of institutional settlement. As Dietrich ex-
plains, “The Supreme Court has recognized that unless a state provides an 
additional remedy, clemency is the sole remedy for the constitutionally 
convicted yet innocent prisoner. Therefore, certain safeguards must exist to 
ensure that an actually innocent prisoner has the ability to properly commu-
nicate his innocence to the appropriate authority.”100 
Second, the courts’ legal process-centric approach demonstrates an 
awkward approach to discerning between credible and less credible indi-
vidualization evidence. At the time Osborne was decided, the capabili-
ties of DNA were making waves throughout the criminal justice sys-
tem, not only with regards to the access and testing of DNA evidence, 
but also with regard to how it exposed the frailties of other forensic 
methods employed widely in the criminal justice system.101	
In February 2009 (three months before the Osborne decision) the 
National Academy of Sciences had published the NRC Report, 102 which 
had made the unprecedented conclusion that DNA was the only forensic 
method that had been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, 
and with a high degree of certainty, engage in individualization.103 The 
message was simple: “In a number of forensic science disciplines, forensic 
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science professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their ap-
proach or the accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly 
ineffective in addressing this problem.”104 
However, generally, the NRC Report (and other catalogued criticism of 
forensic identification evidence) has had limited impact in practice.105 In 
particular, it has failed to turn the heads of the judiciary when it comes to 
the admissibility of forensic identification evidence. Despite the NRC Re-
port’s findings, trial judges continue to admit, often unreservedly, forensic 
identification evidence that engages with individualization.106 
These courts also apply the principle of institutional settlement to ration-
alize their decisions, as they routinely defer to trial court applications of 
Daubert.107 They also interpret the Daubert factors inconsistently, and re-
ject the idea that the NRC Report, in particular, has any significant impact 
on the admissibility of such evidence.108 This routine approach has gener-
ated a body precedent that is seemingly impenetrable. Moreover, it reflects 
fidelity to the legal process vision because “horizontal precedent is gener-
ally consistent with legal process theories…”109 A commitment to prece-
dent is also considered fundamental to traditional process thinkers because 
they emphasize the positivist features of that philosophy, namely “its com-
mitment to neutrality and neutral principles, the principle of institutional 
settlement, and the importance of continuity, precedent, and tradition in 
law.”110 
In fact, the American common law system’s commitment to the principle 
of stare decisis leads to this sort of body of precedent being able to natu-
rally preserve itself. For instance, “if a judge knows that precedent dictates 
that individualization testimony by bite-mark examiners is admissible evi-
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dence, he is likely to (at least as a starting position) reason that all individu-
alization evidence by all bite-mark examiners is admissible.”111 State v. 
Brooks112 highlights such an approach. In Brooks, despite concerns about 
the credibility of the state’s expert, and the fact other experts found incon-
sistencies between the bite-mark on the victim and Brooks’ teeth, the ma-
jority of the court took the chance, on the basis of precedent, to “state af-
firmatively that bite mark identification evidence is admissible in 
Mississippi.”113 The author has previously concluded the application of 
such a broad-brush approach “avoids an immediate examination and dis-
courages a future examination of the substance of the tension between law 
and science in this context.”114 As Beecher-Monas has found: 
When defense counsel do challenge bite-mark testimony, they are rarely suc-
cessful. Courts simply decline to engage in any serious analysis of these chal-
lenges. By far the most widely used gate-keeping avoidance technique that 
judges employ is admitting bite-mark evidence because other courts have done 
so. Rather than engage in any analysis of the scientific principles on which the 
testimony is based, the data underlying the testimony, the methodology, error 
rate, or general acceptance by the scientific community, these courts skirt the 
entire issue . . . .115 
The general approach of the judiciary to routinely reject claims that cen-
ter on the case of Osborne, therefore, highlights an interesting paradox. On 
the one hand, the judiciary continue to favor individualization evidence 
from a variety of crime-solving ‘soft’ forensic science disciplines – despite 
such practices being significantly criticized for lacking, at present, adequate 
scientific underpinning.116 On the other hand, the courts are comfortable in 
taking a comparably conservative approach to questions concerning access 
to DNA testing. 
This is a sharp (and troubling) contrast because DNA is undoubtedly 
more scientifically qualified to engage in individualization than other foren-
sic science identification methods.117 DNA analysis has been subject to rig-
orous evaluation standards from the beginning.118 Numerous institutions 
funded and conducted extensive basic research, followed by applied re-
search, and serious studies on DNA analysis preceded the establishment and 
																																																													
111 Cooper, supra note 46, at 10.  
112  Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999). 
113 Id. at 739.  
114 Cooper, supra note 46, at 10. 
115 Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1369, 1395 (2009). 
116 Id. at 1395–96. 
117 NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 101. 
118 NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 101. 
 228 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIX:iii 
implementation of “individualization” criteria and parameters for assessing 
the probative value of claims of individualization.119 The NRC Report set 
out this distinction clearly, 
This history stands in sharp contrast to the history of research involving most 
other forensic science disciplines, which have not benefitted from extensive ba-
sic research, clinical applications, federal oversight, vast financial support from 
the private sector for applied research, and national standards for quality assur-
ance and quality control. The goal is not to hold other disciplines to DNA’s 
high standards in all respects; after all, it is unlikely that most other current fo-
rensic methods will ever produce evidence as discriminating as DNA. How-
ever, the least that the courts should insist upon from any forensic discipline is 
certainty that practitioners in the field adhere to enforceable standards, ensuring 
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, 
but reliable.120 
The courts are not meaningfully acknowledging this contrast. At present, 
the judiciary is supporting the use of what we know to be less reliable indi-
vidualization evidence, and hampering the use of the most credible indi-
vidualization evidence.121 And, ironically, both approaches are underpinned 
by a fidelity to the legal process vision. 
B. THE PROTECTION OF FINALITY INTERESTS 
Finality is an umbrella term used to cover a variety of “interests” alleg-
edly furthered by restricting post-conviction relief.122 These interests in-
clude: ensuring respect for criminal judgments and victims’ rights, conserv-
ing state resources, furthering the efficiency and deterrent and educational 
functions of the criminal law, satisfying the human need for closure, incen-
tivizing defense counsel to “get it right first time,” and preventing a flood of 
non-controversial claims from masking the fewer, credible ones.123 
The doctrine of finality made up by the courts’ preservation of these in-
terests is underpinned by the legal process vision. This is because the notion 
of finality was conceived in the spirit that the efficacy of outcomes pro-
duced by the criminal justice system requires the application of a procedural 
model that provides “a reasoned and acceptable probability that justice will 
be done.”124 Thus, if a rational process (absent procedural error) generates a 
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conviction; that conviction is legitimate in the eyes of process thinkers.125 
Appeals seeking to undermine such rationally generated convictions are to 
be narrowly construed, and, thus, the appellate process naturally protects 
finality interests by narrowing avenues for relief. 
Concerns about disturbing finality interests have played a direct role in 
numerous Supreme Court decisions relevant to this article. For instance, in 
Osborne, the majority were restrained by the “dilemma”126 DNA presented 
to America’s “established system of justice”,127 signaling that its decision 
was underpinned by concerns that the creation of a constitutional right to 
access DNA for testing would too severely undermine “traditional notions” 
of finality.128 
The decision in Herrera was similarly underpinned.129 Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that allowing actual innocence 
to stand solely as a ground for federal habeas relief would have a “very dis-
ruptive effect…on the need for finality”130, and was mindful of the “enor-
mous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would 
place on the States…”131 At some point in time, the majority opined, “the 
State's interest in finality must outweigh the prisoner's interest in yet an-
other round of litigation.”132  The Court further remarked that, if a peti-
tioner was to have a freestanding right to make an actual innocence claim, 
the threshold for relief would “necessarily be extraordinarily high.”133 This 
rationale drew upon a fundamental “interest” of finality, namely the preven-
tion of frivolous claims flooding the appellate system and masking the 
fewer, credible claims. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, “If the federal 
courts are to entertain claims of actual innocence, their attention, efforts, 
and energy must be reserved for the truly extraordinary case; they ought not 
be forced to sort through the insubstantial and the incredible as well.”134 
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An active, yet somewhat veiled, protection of finality interests by the 
courts is evident in decisions rejecting challenges concerning, in particular, 
the veracity of firearms identification evidence (especially those made sub-
sequent to the NRC Report).135 When rejecting such challenges, the courts 
rely on two particular finality interests, namely preventing non-
controversial claims from flooding the system and incentivizing defense 
counsel.136 In relation to preventing non-controversial claims flooding the 
system, courts often conclude that the admission of such evidence was 
“non-prejudicial” in light of other evidence against the petitioner.137 In 
other words, the courts are terming the (legally sound or unsound) admis-
sion of firearms identification evidence as non-controversial and implying 
such evidence is of inconsequential impact on the jury. In relation to incen-
tivizing defense counsel, the courts emphasize the importance of the adver-
sarial system, highlighting that it is the role of defense counsel to weed out 
frailties in forensic evidence through cross-examination, and the function of 
the jury to assess the credibility and weight of such evidence after that 
process. 138 Notably, courts also, in particular, draw upon the ‘incentivizing 
defense counsel’ finality interest in order to rationalize rejections to chal-
lenges to the veracity of fingerprint identification evidence.139 In those 
cases, the courts indicate a belief that that the adversarial system will func-
tion to “resolve and neutralize” any post–NRC Report concerns about the 
reliability of fingerprint evidence.140 
These approaches can be problematic, however. This is largely because 
they divorce the relevant ‘science’ from its social context by overlooking 
the difficulties that the social actors involved in the adversarial model – in 
particular lawyers and jurors – can have in handling scientific evidence ac-
curately. As Faigman puts it, as consumers of science, lawyers (and jurors, 
judges and extended legal personnel), “have very little understanding of the 
product they are buying.”141 
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For instance, consider the following two cases. In People of Illinois v. 
Morris,142 Morris appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to request an admissibility hearing 
with regards to the fingerprint evidence against him.143 The state’s expert 
had testified that a palm print recovered from a bloody shovel found at the 
crime scene matched Morris’ palm print.144 The court rejected Morris’ ar-
gument, reasoning Morris did not suffer prejudice because, even minus the 
fingerprint evidence, “there was still overwhelming evidence that he was 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”145 This other evidence included that 
Morris was angry and acted aggressively towards the victim, was observed 
leaving the victim’s house just prior to the discovery of the murder, and that 
the blood on his clothing matched the victim’s DNA profile.146 
In 2014, in Abdull-Salaam v. Beard,147 the appellant appealed his convic-
tions for multiple violent offences, claiming recent scientific developments 
undermined the “reliability and admissibility” of the fingerprint evidence 
against him.148 The state presented evidence that his prints “matched” a 
print found on an extension cord wrapper at the crime scene.149 In rejecting 
the argument, the court stated: 
Appellant's argument conveniently overlooks that even in the absence of such 
fingerprint evidence, there was overwhelming eyewitness testimony placing 
Appellant at the scene of the crime. At least four persons who were at the scene 
of the crime testified that Appellant shot the police officer…Thus, even if we 
were to accept Appellant's argument regarding the fingerprint evidence, Appel-
lant is simply unable to show that the evidence would have altered the outcome 
of the trial.150 
Both decisions downplay the impact that fingerprint individualization 
evidence would likely have had on the jury. As such, the courts are argua-
bly overlooking that evidence, which is presented as both scientific and ca-
pable of concluding that the defendant was present at the crime scene in 
terms of absolute certainty, has a highly persuasive impact on jurors. Re-
search suggests statements made by such experts are given “considerable 
deference” by jurors and the impact of these statements is likely not to be 
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“undone” by cross-examination or rebuttal witnesses.151 It is even sug-
gested jurors feel more inclined towards an expert who is subject to a vig-
orous cross-examination, as opposed to more skeptical about the reliability 
of his or her evidence.152 
Case law also demonstrates that the difficulties lawyers may have in re-
sourcing, making and understanding challenges to forensic science evidence 
are being similarly overlooked.153 For instance, cases such as United States 
v. Perkins154 and United States v. Sebbern155 demonstrate that counsel may 
struggle to couch their challenges to the veracity of firearms identification 
evidence effectively. Cases like Sebbern also show, along with cases such 
as Thomas v. State156 and Jones v. United States,157 that counsel might fail 
to do something more specific to challenge firearms identification evidence, 
such as hire an expert, make an objection, or cross-examine.158 All told, 
these cases show, 
That the courts are acknowledging counsels’ deficiencies but not unpacking 
why counsel may have made these inadvertent mistakes or, indeed, strategic 
decisions. The reasons why, of course, may be many and varied, but one impor-
tant rationale courts should not overlook—but seemingly do—is that counsel 
encounter specific difficulties when engaging with forensic science.159 
Notably, judges—including those making the appellate decisions in these 
cases—can experience similar difficulties to jurors and lawyers. Judges, 
too, generally lack scientific expertise and technical training. 160  Some ar-
gue that judges generally “do not think like scientists” and therefore have 
restricted ability to make accurate assessments about science.161  As Saks 
notes: 
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Just as legal training teaches one the intellectual skills to analyze legal prob-
lems, scientific training teaches one how to analyze empirical questions and 
proposed answers. This places judges in a weak position to know what ques-
tions need to be asked in order to test an empirical claim or how to evaluate the 
data offered in answer.162 
Professor Frederic I. Lederer further notes that lawyers’ educational defi-
ciency (when it comes to scientific knowledge) “… often places lawyers at 
a disadvantage when confronted with scientific evidence…lawyers often 
fail to ask the right questions and uncritically accept scientific asser-
tions.”163 The NRC Report recognized this was a significant issue as well, 
stating that, “lawyers and judges often have insufficient training and back-
ground in scientific methodology, and they often fail to fully comprehend 
the approaches employed by different forensic science disciplines and the 
reliability of forensic science evidence . . . .”164 
The institutions of law and science are two powerful social enterprises. 
To divorce either from their social context threatens to undermine their 
epistemological legitimacy. Notably, the principle of institutional compe-
tence is premised on several assumptions about law and society, including 
that “society is capable of functioning rationally when properly guided by 
law.”165 This premise requires that relevant institutions possess the “exper-
tise necessary to efficiently manage changing social conditions” and “match 
society's increasing complexity.”166 This includes the ability to “distinguish 
fairly among competing characteristics of law's social, political, and ideo-
logical purposes . . . [and] includes the ability to separate fact from norm 
when interpreting and applying law.”167 At present, there is a question mark 
over whether key social actors operating in the courts have, on a meaningful 
scale, the levels of expertise necessary to accurately address the complexi-
ties associated with the scientific uncertainty that numerous forensic science 
disciplines, like firearms identification and fingerprint identification, are 
currently subject to.168 As the institution granted competence to address 
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ing this vacuum. The Commission’s sub-committee for Science and Law Training has recommended the 
implementation of a national curriculum aimed at improving the expertise of these social actors (particu-
larly judges and lawyers). See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE 
CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/795351/download. The 
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these complexities, as they are presented in the form of legal challenges, the 
courts need to acknowledge these internal deficiencies and take steps to-
wards limiting them. 
C. THE ACCEPTANCE OF OUTCOMES GENERATED BY RATIONAL 
(YET ILL-SUITED FOR ACCURATELY ASSESSING SCIENTIFIC 
UNCERTAINTY) PROCEDURES 
The principle of institutional settlement dictates that decisions made by 
competent institutions, by way of rational procedures, ought to be accepted 
as binding “unless and until they [the procedures] are duly changed.”169 
Procedure thus provides a normative dimension to the law, transforming 
“law as fact to law as a normative legitimate statement.”170 Procedure is vi-
tal to the stability and legitimacy of the law because, inter alia, it provides 
the law with a modicum of hindsight, with Eskridge and Frickey noting, 
“the substance of decision cannot be planned in advance in the form of rules 
and standards,” but “the procedure of decision commonly can be.”171 
Legal process theory takes the view that procedure that is “soundly 
adapted to the type of power to be exercised is conducive to well-informed 
and wise decisions.”172 Because the principle of institutional settlement op-
erates as a principle of justice, attention to the constant improvement of all 
of the procedures which depend upon the principle must be paid in an “ef-
fort to assure that they yield decisions which are not merely preferable to 
the chaos of no decision but are calculated as well . . . to advance the larger 
purposes of society.”173 
What can be taken from this is that procedures must be reasonably 
adapted to the task at hand in order to generate legitimate results. Moreover, 
those procedures need not be static – they can (and should) – be amended in 
order to reflect social and technological developments in order to better 
yield legitimate results. Yet, newly discovered evidence procedures provide 
an example of how seemingly rational procedures can, when examined 
closely, be ill-suited to producing well-informed and wise decisions. 
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Rather, when it comes to assessing scientific uncertainty, these procedures 
might well invite court decisions that are “ill-informed and unwise.”174 
Take the typical make-up of a state newly discovered evidence rule, for 
example. Findley summarizes that these rules, “involve some combination 
of showings that the new evidence could not have been discovered prior to 
trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence; that the evidence is relevant 
and not cumulative or merely impeaching; and that the new evidence cre-
ates a sufficient probability of a different result at a new trial.”175 A decon-
struction of this generic formula shows how these seemingly rationale rules 
can be particularly problematic for petitioners using them to obtain relief, 
after being convicted in part or whole on the basis of erroneous forensic 
science identification evidence.176 As the author has concluded previously, 
“petitioners making such claims have a very steep mountain to climb.”177 
This steep mountain is exemplified in cases where petitioners have al-
leged that the criticism aimed at standard tool-mark identification evidence 
is newly discovered evidence.178 The appellate courts have responded con-
servatively to these claims, choosing to (1) defer to lower court decisions 
regarding the disqualification of newly discovered evidence i.e., invoke 
standard principles of institutional settlement; and (2) not label the findings 
of the 2009 NRC Report – including the unprecedented finding that indi-
vidualization was not proper in forensic disciplines such as firearms identi-
fication–as newly discovered evidence.179 These cases show that the shift in 
scientific opinion contained in the 2009 NRC Report, with regards to fire-
arms identification evidence, fails to qualify as newly discovered evi-
dence.180 The author has previously concluded this is due largely because 
courts take the view that it presents no “new” facts given that it cites to 
older research and lacks specificity to individual cases.181  As noted by Cole 
and Edmond, the judiciary’s “intense focus on the case, the particular wit-
ness, their opinion and its relation to facts in issue . . . .”182 has made it dif-
ficult for petitioners to apply general concerns from the 2009 NRC Report 
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to “specific case-based evidence relevant to prosecutions and appeals.”183 
“Courts are interested in relevant—that is, probative—evidence bearing on 
facts in issue in the specific proceedings.”184 As it stands, petitioners are 
failing to bridge the gap between the NRC Report’s findings and the impact 
they have on the evidence in their cases.185 This failure tends to fail to meet 
the requirements of the newly discovered evidence rules.186  
The situation is similar in relation to other ‘soft’ forensic science identi-
fication methods, namely fingerprint analysis, microscopic hair analysis, 
shoe-print analysis, and blood stain pattern analysis. The cases of Johnston 
v. State,187 Enderle v. Iowa,188 and Pennsylvania v. Edmiston189 demonstrate 
this. Again, these cases show that the demand (by newly discovered evi-
dence rules) for probative evidence that bears on the specific facts at issue 
is fatal for newly discovered evidence claims.190 In other words, the sui 
generis nature of the rules (and adversarial legal proceedings in general), 
has been used to limit the impact of the 2009 NRC Report to support newly 
discovered evidence claims based on shifting scientific opinion and/or con-
troversy in various forensic science identification disciplines. 
In addition, newly discovered evidence rules present judges with an in-
terpretative task that demands that, to a certain extent, they resolve the rele-
vant scientific uncertainty themselves. For instance, in the course of their 
decision-making judges must determine the significance of the alleged sci-
entific uncertainty, the point at which (if possible) it became a ‘new’ school 
of thought, and how that time-period relates to questions of diligence and 
fact-finding in the instant case before them.  The problems that a judge can 
face when confronted with a newly discovered evidence claim based on the 
argument that ‘new’ developments in fire science undermine an arson con-
viction, which is based on ‘hallmarks’ of arson being identified at a fire 
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scene, provide a good example of how this situation can materialize.191 In 
such cases, a judge’s task can be: 
Fraught with difficulty, right from the first factual assessment he faces. The 
main problem is that there is scientific uncertainty in relation to the veracity of 
arson indicators and the assessment of arson fires, and the judge must attempt 
to resolve that uncertainty when determining the newly discovered evidence 
claim. This is a near impossible challenge for the judge, not in the sense that he 
can't make the relevant decision fairly and rationally - but in the sense that he 
will struggle to make it accurately.192 
This difficulty likely envelopes the majority of newly discovered evi-
dence claims premised on alleged shifts in scientific opinion, given the very 
evolutive nature of the general scientific method and the provisional nature 
of the products it yields.193 In other words, definite, accurate and final an-
swers about a particular ‘science’ are extremely hard (if at all possible) to 
ascertain. 
As demonstrated above, newly discovered evidence procedures routinely 
lead to the rejection of newly discovered evidence claims that relate to the 
presence of uncertainty in forensic science disciplines. This, in turn, creates 
a robust body of precedent that sidelines substantive accuracy, and is ap-
plied in a vicious circle. The outcome may be (seemingly) rationally gener-
ated, but it is not necessarily substantively accurate. 
Procedure should, according to the legal process vision, encompass a 
self-corrective function.194 Newly discovered evidence rules need to be ex-
amined through a more critical lens when it comes to their ability to facili-
tate relief in cases presenting credible claims of shifting scientific opinion. 
At present, in this context, the courts are preserving a cosmetically rational 
procedure that is substantively deficient. As such, courts are exalting form 
over substance, which as subsection D explains, is another symptom of loy-
alty to the legal process vision. 
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D. THE EXALTION OF FORM OVER SUBSTANCE IN A DESIRE TO 
ENGENDER RATIONALITY 
Rationality is a key feature of the legal process vision. One way for 
courts to engender rationality in their decision-making processes is to en-
gage in reductionism.   As Midgley has pointed out, in an intellectual world 
reductionism offers order and simplicity.195 The trouble with a largely unre-
served desire for rationality through procedure, however, is that it can tend 
to “exalt the form over the substance of what is being said, the method over 
the aim of an activity, and precision of detail over the completeness of 
cover.”196 
The courts can be seen to be taking reductionist approaches to the uncer-
tainty presently pervading certain forensics ‘soft’ science disciplines. They 
seemingly take this approach in order to generate rational decision-making 
that accounts for the relevant scientific uncertainty and, for all intents and 
purposes, resolves it. For instance, we may consider the cases of United 
States v. Green,197 United States v. Monteiro, 198 United States v. Diaz,199 
and United States v. Glynn,200 and United States v. Taylor.201 In these cases 
the courts have curtailed the testimony of firearms examiners, preventing 
them from testifying in terms of absolute certainty and individualization. 
The courts in these cases have, instead, required examiners to testify in, al-
legedly, more diluted terms such as “more likely than not” and “to a rea-
sonable ballistic certainty.”202 
This approach, which appears to be a judicial attempt to rationalize the 
criticism aimed at individualization evidence in the context of firearms 
identification, reduces the criticism to a mere issue of terminology. This ap-
proach, however, does not resolve the underlying – far more complicated – 
problem concerning the currently unknown scientific validity and reliability 
of individualization claims by firearms examiners.203 A 2009 study supports 
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this point, finding that both judges and jurors are comfortable converting 
subjective probability evidence into findings of liability.204 As such, limit-
ing the testimony of firearms examiners (and other such examiners for that 
matter) to allegedly more diluted phrases may well not have the desired ef-
fect of deterring judges and jurors “from inaccurately thinking there is an 
absolute ‘match’ between suspect ammunition and a known weapon. In 
other words, this reductionist approach has overlooked relevant social con-
cepts i.e., how the terminology will be interpreted by the social actors in-
volved in the criminal justice process.”205 The National Commission on Fo-
rensic Science’s sub-committee has also chastised the use of these phrases, 
stating they are meaningless in a scientific sense.206 Cases such as United 
States v. Gutierrez-Castro207 also demonstrate a court taking a reductionist 
approach to the complex interaction between judge, jury, and expert. In that 
case, the court would not allow the state’s fingerprint identification witness 
(who would testify that suspect prints belonged to Gutierrez-Castro) to be 
referred to as an “expert” in the jury’s presence.208 This holding reflects a 
judicial attempt to engender rationality in its decision-making by endeavor-
ing to respond to the notion that expert labels can easily seduce jurors.209 
To an extent, therefore, the Gutierrez-Castro decision engages with the so-
cial context aspects relevant to the tension between the legal process and 
the forensic science at issue. This is important, as, in the context of finger-
print identification, studies have found that a vast majority of jurors agree 
that fingerprint identification is a ‘science’ and that fingerprints are the 
most reliable means of identification.210 Still, the mere censoring of expert 
labels does not necessarily resolve the bigger tension and complex social 
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context issue, namely how jurors interpret testimony that, in no uncertain 
terms, links a suspect to suspect evidence via a ‘soft’ forensic science. This 
is because when jurors engage in decision-making about forensic science 
evidence, studies show that, in addition to expert testimony shaping their 
thoughts, jurors’ perceptions about the evidence can be shaped by a pleth-
ora of other experiences. This includes their prior beliefs and expectations, 
value judgments about expert and evidence credibility, the risk of error, 
how the forensic evidence aligns with other evidence presented in the case, 
and how it is popularized and conveyed by the media and other literature.211 
III. CONCLUSION 
The courts demonstrate a systemically conservative approach towards 
appellate challenges to the veracity of ‘soft’ forensic science identification 
evidence, and claims for access to DNA testing in order to, inter alia, sup-
port an application for clemency. Relevant case law reveals that the courts’ 
approach is underpinned by a fidelity to the legal process vision. In particu-
lar, the courts demonstrate (A) a deference to the principle of institutional 
settlement; (B) a keenness to protect ‘finality’ interests in order to foreclose 
claims for relief; (C) an acceptance of outcomes generated by rational pro-
cedures (despite such procedures being ill-suited for making accurate as-
sessments about scientific uncertainty); and (D) an exaltation of form over 
substance in an attempt to engender rationality when faced with scientific 
uncertainty. Collectively, these themes are consistent with the legal process 
vision. Unfortunately, however, they can invariably sideline notions of sub-
stantive accuracy. 
This article confirms the existence of these legal process-centric themes 
in relevant case law and has considered possible implications. It is impor-
tant to consider, however, that these themes are not insular, but rather inter-
related. For instance, the principle of institutional settlement is the corner-
stone feature of all four themes given. Each one focuses on procedure, the 
preservation of competent institutional decisions, precedent, and the genera-
tion of rationality to varying extents. The notion that science is divorced 
from its social context by the legal process vision in this context similarly 
pervades each theme. Finality is not only visible in the courts’ selection of 
specific ‘interests’ to rationalize their rejections of claims, but is also re-
flected in the high thresholds for relief embodied in newly discovered evi-
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dence rules (and beyond). Moreover, newly discovered evidence rules are 
not the only seemingly rational post-conviction procedures that produce 
substantively questionable results in terms of how they guide the assess-
ment of scientific uncertainty. The Daubert standard212 – regulating the ad-
missibility of the vast majority of expert evidence across America – is open 
to the same criticism. In addition, the notion that courts exalt form over 
substance goes beyond reductionist approaches to expert terminology and 
labels, but also comprises ‘finality’ which is, in the end, an umbrella term 
for a variety of complex interests, and therefore also a reductionist concept. 
This complicated web of legal process theory-associated ideas has a sig-
nificant influence on the practical application of the law. An emphasis on 
process does, indeed, assist the law to maintain social order, stability, ra-
tionality and predictability. These are all fundamental, important features 
that should be preserved. However, it is now certain that rational, consistent 
and well-intentioned procedures can generate substantively erroneous re-
sults. As such, the courts (and other institutions) should have a closer eye 
on substance and, in particular, the substantive accuracy that can be ap-
proximated, to varying degrees, by progressing scientific thought. 
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